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INTRODUCTION
Many observers consider the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) vital for the protection of consumer health and safety. One
hundred years ago, Congress established the entity that would become
the FDA and authorized it to regulate foods and drugs, critical respon-
sibilities that the agency has long discharged carefully. Throughout
the past century, the FDA's regulatory power has expanded systemati-
cally, albeit gradually, while legislatures and courts in the fifty Ameri-
can jurisdictions broadened liability exposure for manufacturers that
sold defective products that injured consumers. Observers have re-
cently criticized the agency for overseeing pharmaceuticals too leni-
ently, even as states increasingly narrowed manufacturers' liability
exposure. For instance, numerous jurisdictions have elevated burdens
of proof and circumscribed damage awards.
Substantially less clear is the relationship between FDA regulation
and the products liability cause of action. Conventional wisdom holds
that agency mandates and common law suits occupy distinct, albeit
intersecting, universes. Comparatively few legislative and judicial bod-
ies in the states assign great relevance to defendants' conformity with
regulation, and only a small number expressly apply a "regulatory
compliance defense." However, scrutiny reveals that more jurisdic-
tions address conformity in ways that profoundly, yet subtly, affect the
cause of action. Because compliance and the defense have significant
effects on personal injury litigation, they require evaluation, which
this Article undertakes.
Part I provides an overview of this Article's scope. Part II then
descriptively analyzes the origins and expansion of FDA regulation.
Part III details the weight legislatures and courts have traditionally ac-
corded compliance and the increasing relevance that both assign to
the concept, ascertaining that a growing number of states make con-
formity a factor that limits defendants' liability exposure. Part IV next
reviews whether the disadvantages of this phenomenon outweigh the
benefits and finds that they do. This Article concludes by proffering
suggestions that recognize the compelling societal value of drugs, the
importance of uniform manufacturer regulation, and the acute need
for the essentially individualized patient consideration that common
law suits afford.
I
AN INTRODUCTORY WORD, MAINLY CONCERNING SCOPE
The historical background of the regulatory compliance defense
merits rather extensive assessment to help clarify the ambiguities that
suffuse its beginnings, development, conceptualization, recognition,
and application. The defense's relatively uncertain origins are in-
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formative, as are discrepancies in how jurisdictions characterized and
enforced the idea.
The growth of the defense epitomizes broader, contemporary
products liability trends that have increasingly restricted manufactur-
ers' exposure. Truncated statutes of limitations, accentuated proof
burdens, narrowed liability theories, and confined damage awards are
illustrative. Especially striking is some jurisdictions' requirement that
consumers allegedly injured by defective prescription pharmaceuticals
show that the manufacturer's negligence caused harm.' This Article
alludes to some of the topics that I have enumerated; however, most
of these considerations implicate the defense generally and thus ex-
ceed the scope of this discussion. The ways in which numerous states
restrict damages can be instructive, yet ultimately explain few proposi-
tions that liability fails to illuminate. 2 Medical devices concomitantly
warrant abbreviated treatment here, even though their FDA regula-
tion and liability exposure for defects resemble pharmaceuticals. 3 Lit-
igation under consumer fraud and protection acts needs analogous
consideration.
This Article correspondingly deemphasizes a few modern
precepts that relate to the defense. The first is the learned intermedi-
ary rule, which effectively insulates from liability for failure to warn
those sellers whose FDA-approved labels correctly advise prescribing
physicians. 4 This Article examines the learned intermediary rule as
one significant concomitant of the defense in warning litigation. An-
other is preemption, which commentators aptly describe as a "close
cousin ' 5 of the defense, but this approach involves the question,
1 The states rejected strict liability in tort, which is generally easier for injured con-
sumers to prove. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) ("[A]
drug manufacturer's liability for a defectively designed drug should not be measured by
the standards of strict liability . . . ."); see also Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95
(Utah 1991) (same). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998)
(prescribing negligence liability for manufacturers of defective prescription drugs and
medical devices).
2 See infra note 161.
3 See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (provid-
ing for the safety of medical devices); see also Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort
Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2123 (2000); infra note
19.
4 See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson &Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 914 (W. Va.
2007) (describing, and refusing to adopt, the traditional learned intermediary rule); Perez
v. Wyeth Labs Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1254-55 (N.J. 1999) (describing the same rule); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 6(d) & cmt. d; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 365, at 1010-12 (2000); 2 DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARYJ. DAVIS,
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 22:9, at 566-68 (3d ed. 2000); infra notes
128-40 and text accompanying notes 204-05.
5 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14.3, at 886 (2005). Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg articulates a regulatory compliance defense by recognizing that a "medical device
manufacturer may be entitled to interpose a regulatory compliance defense based on the
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under the Supremacy6 and Commerce Clauses, 7 of when a federal re-
quirement overrides state products law with which it appears to con-
flict.8 Preemption deserves minimal analysis here because it has
received discussion elsewhere, including other Articles in this
symposium. 9
This Article's focus is, thus, an FDA regulatory compliance de-
fense under strict liability and negligence tort rubrics, and in particu-
lar liability for defective warnings, rather than under implied or
express warranty theories. 10 The Article stresses drug regulation; FDA
comprehensiveness, expertise, and stringency and the varying ways
that pharmaceuticals affect individual patients highlight crucial as-
pects of the defense and comprise the best case for its application. 1
FDA's approval of the premarket application," while she proffers the defense as one justifi-
cation for rejecting the notion that medical-device premarket approval preempts state tort
law. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013, 1020 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8 See generally Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (balloon catheters); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470 (1996) (pacemakers); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (ciga-
rettes); DOBBS, supra note 4, § 373, at 1033-37 (explaining how federal law preempts state
tort law); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-28, at 1172-79 (3d ed.
2000) (describing the history and statutory interpretation of the preemption doctrine);
Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government Standards De-
fense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 903, 907-24 (1996) (discussing the history and modem use of
preemption); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2053-60
(2000) (describing how federal law may preempt state regulations and tort liability rules).
9 See James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA s Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics & a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 939, pt. XIII (2008); Catherine
T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-
Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1039, 192-206 & nn.7-22
(2008). For sources discussing preemption outside of this symposium, see, for example,
OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.4, at 895-920; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption By Preamble: Fed-
eral Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227 (2007) (describing an
increasing trend of federal preemption of state law). I do not analyze the government
contractor defense, which allows defendants that manufacture products under a federal
government contract to avoid liability in certain situations, because it is a "more distant
cousin" of the regulatory compliance defense. OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 881-86; see
also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988) (holding state law displaced
under the government contractor defense).
10 Warning defects merit precedence because courts rarely deem FDA-approved
drugs defectively designed. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 6 cmt. f
(1998). A few states treat warranty similarly to strict liability. See, e.g., Sensenbrenner v.
Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988).
11 See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD.
L. REv. 1210, 1239-57 (1996) (describing the rationale and operation of the regulatory
compliance defense and the best-case idea); Noah, supra note 8, at 926-60 (discussing
justifications for the regulatory compliance defense and the best-case idea); cf Michael D.
Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 461, 501-07 (1997) (assessing the possible effects of a regulatory compliance de-
fense); Rabin, supra note 8, at 2074-78 (same). See generally OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at
892-94 (arguing that FDA approval should not immunize drug manufacturers from
liability).
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Yet this Article also explores how other agencies regulate other prod-
ucts and how courts and legislatures articulate the defense for them.
Those questions inform comprehension of FDA regulation and appli-
cation of the defense. The Article will review statutory and case devel-
opments because legislative entities have assumed considerable
responsibility for adopting the defense, primarily under the "tort re-
form" label at the behest of manufacturers and insurers.
Finally, certain ambiguities complicate appreciation of the de-
fense. One is the notion's genesis. Many jurisdictions fail to recog-
nize the precept explicitly, while a number that apparently invoke the
concept assign different relevance to evidence of conformity when as-
certaining whether manufacturers were negligent or purveyed defec-
tive goods. 12 Therefore, the term "regulatory compliance defense"
applies only to tort schemes in which the manufacturer completely
avoids liability for selling purportedly defective items, rather than the
relatively limited, different weight that a number of states accord
conformity.
II
FDA REGULATION'S ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
Numerous authors have chronicled the beginnings and expan-
sion of FDA regulation.1 3 However, some treatment is appropriate to
increase understanding of the comprehensive duties the agency ful-
fills-through control of research, development, approval, marketing,
and distribution of pharmaceuticals and other goods-as well as the
interplay between FDA regulation and products liability.
In 1906, Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drug Act as a
response to growing concerns, principally over food safety, 14 that were
depicted most tellingly in accounts like The Jungle by Upton Sinclair. 15
This law created the entity that would become the FDA and author-
ized it to regulate food and drugs. 16 Thereafter, Congress passed the
New Drug Amendments of 1938, which increased FDA power and re-
vamped the new drug approval system. 17 In 1962, Congress pre-
scribed major amendments that updated and broadened FDA
12 See OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 888-91 (describing differing approaches to the
regulatory compliance notion).
13 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 109-12 (2006). See generally Richard A. Merrill, The
Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996) (describ-
ing the history of statutes and policies enlarging the FDA's jurisdiction).
14 Merrill, supra note 13, at 1758.
15 See UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
16 See Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
17 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); Merrill,
supra note 13, at 1797-1801.
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responsibility for food and drugs.' 8 In 1976, lawmakers passed the
Medical Device Amendments, which granted the FDA expansive au-
thority over the mechanisms and resembles somewhat its drug regula-
tory power. 19 During 1997 and 2000, Congress instituted substantial
amendments that enhanced FDA control of and authority over im-
ported pharmaceuticals.2 0
A commissioner appointed by the President heads the FDA,
which relies mainly on career specialists who possess expertise in
medicine, science, technology, and public policy. 2' The agency con-
comitantly depends on expert advisory committees that render opin-
ions on new drug applications and related issues. 22 Congress
delegated to the agency responsibility for balancing pharmaceutical
risks and therapeutic advantages in the new drug approval, process,
which mandates that the FDA regulate pharmaceutical safety and ef-
fectiveness as well as drug labels. 23 Like most similar agencies in the
European Union and other technologically advanced nations, the
FDA has received much criticism and has experienced scandals. 24
These concerns notwithstanding, the agency's technical de-
mands, review procedures, and scientific quality make U.S. pharma-
ceutical regulation one of the world's most stringent regimes,
ensuring that "the American drug supply continues to be among the
safest in the world." 25 For instance, broad FDA power to mandate
thorough research and experimentation-including in vitro, in vivo,
and clinical testing-and good manufacturing practices before it ap-
proves the labeling, marketing, and sale of new drugs, in addition to
the agency's postapproval requirements and other expansive author-
ity, mean that FDA regulation is strict and generally protects consum-
ers from defective pharmaceuticals. Indeed, many observers have
18 See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, tit. 1, 76 Stat. 780, 780-92. See
generally SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 AMEND-
MENTS (1974) (discussing the impact of the 1962 Amendments).
19 See Merrill, supra note 13, at 1806-09. Medical devices and their regulation are
important, but the FDA has regulated devices more recently and less pervasively than
drugs, as to which regulation and products liability are representative. Thus, this Article
stresses them and deemphasizes medical devices. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
20 See Act of Oct. 28, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, §§ 745-746, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-35
to -41; Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 406, 111 Stat. 2296, 2369-70.
21 See 21 U.S.C. § 393(d) (1) (2000).
22 See Rabin, supra note 8, at 2075.
23 See 21 U.S.C. § 393(d)(1).
24 See, e.g., Robert Pear & Andrew Pollack, Leader of the FD.A. Steps Down After a Short,
Turbulent Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at Al; Jared A. Favole & Corey Boles,
Lawmakers Fault FDA on Heparin, 'ALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2008, at A2.
25 FDA's Foreign Drug Inspection Program: Hearings Before House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) (statement of Andrew
von Eschenbach, FDA Comm'r), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_
mtgs/110-oi-hrg.110107.vonEschenbach-testimony.pdf; see also supra note 11.
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long contended that the new drug approval regime is excessive and
unduly cumbersome, protracted, and cautious, and that it sometimes
stymies and prevents expeditious marketing of pharmaceuticals that
could save lives and decrease pain.26
Even staunch advocates of FDA regulation, harsh critics of strict
liability, and avid champions of the defense acknowledge numerous
concerns implicating the agency. Some claim that the FDA is overly
politicized and solicitous of large pharmaceutical manufacturers while
not sufficiently responsive to legislative mandates and drug consumers
and that it improved the reporting scheme for post-approval adverse
events too slowly, has committed occasional errors, and is risk
averse. 27 Moreover, FDA regulation can be so narrow and particular
that it fails to capture activities at the margins, while controls that ad-
dress science and technology become outdated faster.28 Limited re-
sources and authority may prevent the FDA from being an effective
arbiter of optimal, rather than minimal, safety.29 The agency does not
comprehensively address important contemporary realities of market-
ing, such as drug manufacturer advertising directly to consumers, or
of the American health care system, in which patients have reduced
access to the doctors who prescribe their pharmaceuticals. 30 For ex-
ample, the FDA may approve a new drug before it receives thorough
experimental data proving the drug is safe and efficacious because the
agency depends substantially on manufacturer information and is
pressured to certify pharmaceuticals quickly, while the FDA might ele-
vate broader societal health goals over individual patients' needs.3 1
Recent threats to product, food, and drug supplies emanating from
imports have generally fueled these criticisms of agency safety regula-
26 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 119-26; W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient
Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24
SETON HALL L. REv. 1437, 1442-49 (1994).
27 See, e.g., Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Lia-
bility Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1153-61 (1988); Peter Schuck, A Cure for What Ails the
FDA, AM. LAWYER, June 26, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticle
Friendly.jsp?id=1 182503155456.
28 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, § 224, at 573; OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 887.
29 See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 890. But see Noah, supra note 8, at 965.
30 See, e.g., Julie Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Drugs, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 673, 677-80 (2007) (studying recent direct-to-consumer adver-
tising and the FDA's tepid response to it); Gary Taubes, Do We Really Know What Makes Us
Healthy?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 52. See generally infra notes 131-40
and accompanying text (describing judges' justifications for restricting the scope of the
learned intermediary rule and how the FDA does not comprehensively address important
contemporary realities of marketing). For a general description of how drug companies
market pharmaceuticals directly to consumers, see EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 161-64.
31 See, e.g., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL TRIALS 22-24 (2007) (recommending
improvements to FDA research monitoring); infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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tion.32 In 2007, lawmakers passed bipartisan reform legislation ad-
dressing a number of issues, especially deficient agency power and
resources.
33
III
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE'S RELEVANCE
A. The Relevance Traditionally Accorded Regulatory
Compliance
1. Early History
The early history of the regulatory compliance defense and prod-
ucts liability warrants scant review here because the first judicial deci-
sions addressing the concept rarely implicated products liability,
applied the doctrine to the FDA, or recognized an explicit defense,
and because numerous scholars have already canvassed the back-
ground.34 However, the FDA was one of the initial agencies that Con-
gress authorized to regulate safety, and much confusion surrounds
the defense. 35 Thus, careful scrutiny might increase appreciation of
the FDA and elucidate the regulatory compliance defense.
a. Products Liability
Although Winterbottom v. Wright,36 an 1842 English case, was the
major source of liability for injuries caused by defective products in
the United States, the traditional rationales underlying strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities, especially blasting, seemingly had
importance. 3 7 Certain judges and scholars find that American courts
misinterpreted Winterbottom to require privity of contract with a defec-
tive product seller before injured parties could recover.38 This view
precluded liability except for articles that judges found inherently or
32 See David Barboza, Scandal and Suicide in China: A Dark Side of Toys, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2007, at Cl; Eric Lipton, Safety Agency Faces Scrutiny Amid Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2007, at Al; Renae Merle, Food Scrutiny Varies Widely in Split System of Inspection, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2007, at Al.
33 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823; Gardiner Harris, Senate Takes Up Bill to Change Drug Agency Operations, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2007, at Al; Sarah Rubinstein et al., Congress Expands FDA Oversight on Drug
Safety, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007, at A12.
34 See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 886-95; Rabin, supra note 8, at 2049-53
(describing early judicial articulation of the regulatory compliance defense).
35 Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device Litiga-
tion, 57 ME. L. REv. 51, 88-89 (2005); Noah, supra note 8, at 964-67.
36 (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. P.).
37 See DOBBS, supra note 4, §§ 346-351, at 950-68 (describing the development of
American strict liability doctrine).
38 See infra notes 40-41, 44-45, 48; see also Frances H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative
Obligations in the Law of Torts, 53 AM. L. REG. 273, 337 (1905); Fleming James, Jr., Products
Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 44 & n.4 (1955).
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imminently dangerous. 39 Throughout.the remainder of the nine-
teenth century, American jurisdictions essentially denied products lia-
bility relief to harmed individuals who were not in privity with the
manufacturer.
This situation dramatically changed in the early 1900s. The New
York Court of Appeals removed the privity barrier to negligence
claims with its 1916 ruling in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.40 The
Washington Supreme Court analogously lifted the bar for implied
warranty claims over adulterated food in the 1913 case of Mazzetti v.
Armour & Co. 41 That same court also recognized an express warranty
products liability cause of action in its 1932 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.
decision. 42 Implied warranty liability only gradually expanded from
foods to drugs to products for intimate bodily use, like shampoo, from
1913 until 1960. 43
In 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,44 ushering in the contemporary products liabil-
ity era.45 The justices recognized an implied warranty cause of action
for selling a defective motor vehicle, 46 and it seemed that this ruling,
together with applicable Uniform Commercial Code sections address-
ing physical harm caused by defective goods, would chart the future
39 See, e.g., Huset v.J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (thresh-
ing machine); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (medicine). See generally OWEN,
supra note 5, §§ 1.2-1.3, at 20-34, § 9.1, at 562-63 (describing the evolution of strict liabil-
ity before U.S. courts); Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REV.
119, 153-55 (1958) (discussing various ways to avoid the privity requirement).
40 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See generally James A. Henderson, MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts While Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003) (describing the factual background of Mac-
Pherson and explaining how those facts were determinative in the court's opinion); Walter
Probert, Applied Jurisprudence: A Case Study in MacPherson v. Buick and Its Precedents, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 789 (1988) (examining how the New York Court of Appeals interpreted its
precedents in MacPherson).
41 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913). See generally William Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1106-10 (1960) (describing jurisdictions'
decisions permitting consumers to bring suits against food manufactures without privity).
42 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932); accord Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E. 2d
612 (Ohio 1958) (removing the privity requirement when a manufacturer offers an ex-
press warranty); see OWEN, supra note 5, § 3.4, at 137-38 (describing the Baxter court's
holding).
43 See, e.g., Mazetti, 135 P. at 636 (holding a food manufacturer subject to an implied
warranty of merchantability); Prosser, supra note 41, at 1104-14 (describing how courts
expanded strict liability to a variety of products).
44 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
45 See DOBBS, supra note 4, § 353, at 974; OWEN, supra note 5, § 1.3, at 23.
46 Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84. The implied warranty cause of action is a hybrid of
contract and tort law. See Mark Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.: Strict Products
Liability Unbound, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 40, at 229, 230 (arguing that Justice Tray-
nor's Escola concurrence helped "free" products liability from contractual restrictions).
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application of products liability.4 7 However, California became the
first jurisdiction to employ strict liability in tort for defective articles
with the 1963 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products case, 48 and the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI) promulgated Section 402A of the 1965 Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which designated this as the appropriate
products liability theory. 49
The cause of action rapidly swept the nation so that by 1980, vir-
tually all jurisdictions had adopted strict liability, most through court
opinions. 50 Courts identified numerous justifications for adopting the
theory. These include the belief that manufacturers are better able to
control risks and spread losses, that negligence is too difficult to
prove, and that strict liability encourages manufacturers to exercise
greater care and has a deterrent effect.5 ' Regarding pharmaceuticals,
strict liability theory acknowledges that drugs have inherent risks but
can also save lives and ameliorate health concerns. 52 Thus, many
states allow manufacturers to sell pharmaceuticals without incurring
liability if the company adequately warns the consumer or physician.53
Courts may then impose liability if a manufacturer fails to provide
these warnings. 5 4
47 See U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (c) (1958) (an implied warranty of merchantability includes
the requirement that goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used").
48 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); see Escola v, Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,
438-39 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the defendant be held
strictly liable for defects that occurred while the product was within the defendant's con-
trol); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAw IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 198-200 (2d ed.
2003) (describing the underlying Escola rationale in terms of risk allocation); Geistfeld,
supra note 46, at 230 (remarking that Justice Traynor's Escola concurrence "helped set in
motion the forces that would lead to the widespread adoption of strict products liability");
William Prosser, The Fall of the Citade4 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 793-94 (1966).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) ("One who sells any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product, and (b) it is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.").
50 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 694
(5th ed. 1984) (observing that Section 402A of the Second Restatement adopting strict
liability "swept the country ... until at the present writing [in 1984] nearly all states have
adopted some version of it"); WHITE, supra note 48, at 244-48 (describing the "unexpected
persistence" of strict liability from 1980-2000) (citations omitted).
51 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 50, § 98, at 692-93.
52 See Rabin, supra note 8, at 2076 (arguing that additional tort liability would ensure
that manufacturers compensate consumers for injury because regulatory compliance fo-
cuses only on safety).
53 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477-78 (Cal. 1988); supra notes 10-11
and accompanying text.
54 See Green & Shultz, supra note 3, at 2121 (analyzing warnings and arguing that the
consumer expectations test overdeters manufacturers of pharmaceuticals); supra notes
10-11 and accompanying text; cf Brown, 751 P. 2d at 477-78 (holding that if the manufac-
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Around 1980, state legislatures began to codify products doctrine,
mainly because of apparent concerns regarding the breadth of liabil-
ity, in ways that narrowed defendants' exposure.55 These measures
ordinarily governed statutes of limitations, proof burdens, theories of
recovery, and damages. 56 The statutes, however, frequently neglected
to address the issue of regulatory conformity.57
b. Regulatory Compliance
State legislatures and courts traditionally accorded manufactur-
ers' compliance with agency regulation minimal or no weight. 58 Prac-
tically all legislative entities left to courts the articulation of
considerable substantive tort law, 59 including products liability and
the relevance of conformity with agency regulation and FDA com-
mands.6 0 Judges in turn enunciated the doctrinal rules applied
through case development by articulating the common law.
Multiple sources contributed to the origination and growth of the
regulatory compliance defense. Professor Rabin and others assert
that the 1892 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Grand Trunk Railway Co.
v. Ives61 was the first authoritative pronouncement on the defense. 62
The railroad defendant asserted that compliance with regulatory man-
dates should be determinative of whether it had exercised sufficient
care.63 The Court disagreed, holding that "neither the legislature nor
railroad commissioners can arbitrarily determine in advance what
shall constitute ordinary care . . . [for] a railroad company at a cross-
ing, in every particular case which may afterwards arisel[.] . . . [E]ach
case must stand upon its own merits, and be decided upon its own
facts and circumstances. '64
Professor Rabin suggests that some might view Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's "cryptic" opinion in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v.
turer has provided the physician with adequate warnings and the physician has communi-
cated the warnings to the patient, the patient has no cause of action).
55 See, e.g., infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
58 See Noah, supra note 8, at 964-65 (arguing that courts' traditional disregard of a
party's regulatory compliance is outdated).
59 See, e.g., Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Can. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 427 (1892) (providing a
clear example of the Supreme Court's rejection of the regulatory compliance defense); see
also Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (providing a second example of
judicial involvement because of the Supreme Court's warning of the "need for caution in
framing standards or behavior that amount to rules of law").
60 See, e.g., Pokora, 292 U.S. at 105; Ives, 144 U.S. at 427.
61 144 U.S. 408.
62 Rabin, supra note 8, at 2050; see also Ives, 144 U.S. at 427 (holding that a party may
have to "do much more than is required by positive enactment").
63 Ives, 144 U.S. at 416-17.
64 Id. at 427.
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Goodman6 5 as articulating the regulatory compliance defense. 66 Jus-
tice Holmes espoused the judge-made rule of law that one who ap-
proaches an unmarked grade crossing must look, listen, stop, exit the
vehicle, and reconnoiter before proceeding. 67 However, Professor Ra-
bin also finds that Justice Benjamin Cardozo's 1934 Pokora v. Wabash
Railway Co. opinion limited the effect of Goodman, as the Justice ad-
monished judges to be cautious when "framing standards of behavior
that amount to rules of law" in confronting diverse factual situations. 68
Another potential, but less clear, source for the defense was ap-
parently the related idea of "negligence per se" or "negligence as a
matter of law," which can expose a person who violates a statute or
regulation to liability.69 This notion allows judges to derive tort stan-
dards from applicable criminal laws, provided that the litigant seeking
to benefit from the rule shows that he or she is within the class the law
protects, the danger is the harm contemplated by the statute, and that
articulating the rule would reflect sound public policy. 70 The class,
hazard, and policy strictures that litigants invoking this doctrine must
satisfy and the legal effect of nonconformity with such a rule-
whether it is negligence per se, a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence, or merely some evidence of negligence-resemble the dynam-
ics of the regulatory compliance defense. 71 For instance, when
treating the regulatory compliance defense, courts often state that the
risk entailed needs to be the danger that the agency control specifi-
cally addresses, 72 which is like the hazard factor, whilejudges correlate
65 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
66 Rabin, supra note 8, at 2049.
67 See Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69-70. A specific rule, if followed, may be viewed as the
precursor to a party's later regulatory defense.
68 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934); see Rabin, supra note 8, at 2049-50. With rare exceptions,
the Supreme Court did not resolve products cases after the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g.,
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874-76 (1986) (holding
that economic injury is not a cognizable products liability cause of action in admiralty).
69 See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 814-15 (N.Y. 1920) (holding intestate's
failure to use his lights during the night to be per se contributory negligence because a
state statute prescribed the use of lights); Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543, 543 (Minn.
1889) ("[Wlhere a statute or municipal ordinance imposes ... a specific duty for the
protection or benefit of others, [a person who] neglects to perform that duty is lia-
ble . . . ."); DOBBS, supra note 4, §§ 133-142, at 311-34 (describing techniques for inter-
preting how statutes apply to tort issues).
70 See, e.g., Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 307 (Tex. 1998) (holding that "the absence
of a relevant common law duty should be considered in deciding whether to apply negli-
gence per se to the [criminal code's] reporting provision"); Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d
777, 778-79 (Cal. 1943) (holding that the defendant's failure to stop at a stop sign, despite
an "irregularity" with the governing county ordinance related to the particular stop sign,
was nonetheless conclusive of the defendant's negligence); Osborne, 41 N.W. at 544 (hold-
ing that the injury sustained must be within the class of injuries that the statute aims to
prevent).
71 See, e.g., supra notes 58-60, 70 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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the value assigned evidence of manufacturer conformity with its rele-
vance and the stringency of agency control, which resembles the effect
that courts accord statutory violations in negligence per se cases. 73
Once courts allowed plaintiffs to show that a defendant's contra-
vention of a legislative or agency mandate constituted negligence per
se, defendants understandably argued that compliance with either
should establish reasonable care as a matter of law.7 4 Manufacturers
often depended on this argument in the nascent field of products liti-
gation, and judicial opinions verify this heritage. 75 A New York court
afforded a trenchant illustration: "Just as failure to comply with a stat-
ute and regulations promulgated thereunder is evidence of negli-
gence, full compliance therewith is some evidence of the exercise of
due care .... *"76 Analogously instructive was a Pennsylvania court's
rejection of the argument: "Compliance with a law or administrative
regulation relieves the actor of negligence per se, but it does not estab-
lish as a matter of law that due care was exercised."77 A Texas court
similarly observed that "mere compliance does not as a matter of law,
in all cases, mean that the party is free from negligence." 78
Before the rise of modern products liability almost fifty years ago,
no state legislature had prescribed the defense and courts issued few
opinions regarding it.79 Relevant decisions rarely governed products
liability, applied to the FDA, or mentioned an express regulatory com-
pliance defense. 80 Illustrative of notable exceptions were several opin-
ions that implicated Chloromycetin.81 Most applicable was the
California Supreme Court's ruling in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.8 2
The court acknowledged the learned intermediary rule but rejected
the regulatory compliance defense, asserting that "mere compliance
with [FDA] regulations or directives as to warnings . . .may not be
sufficient to immunize the manufacturer or supplier," as they could
"be only minimal in nature, and [if] the manufacturer or supplier
knows of, or has reason to know of, greater dangers not included in
the warning, its duty to warn may not be fulfilled. ' 83 Moreover, the
court stated that an "adequate warning to the profession may be
73 See supra notes 58-60, 69-70 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
76 Phillips v. Roux Labs., Inc., 145 N.Y.S.2d 449, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955).
77 Berkebile v. Brandy Helicopter Corp., 281 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
78 Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
79 See Viscusi et al., supra note 26, at 1457-63 (describing how the Restatement (Second)
of Torts sparked a revolution in products liability).
80 See generally id. at 1457-75 (outlining how the "common law regulates
pharmaceuticals").
81 See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 661.
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eroded or even nullified by overpromotion of the drug through a vig-
orous sales program which may have the effect of persuading the pre-
scribing doctor to disregard the warnings given. '84
Typical were rulings outside the drug area, such as First Circuit
and Pennsylvania Superior Court opinions that tersely rejected agency
conformity as a defense 85 in part by relying on Section 288 in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts,86 which provided that an agency command is
only a minimum floor.87 The New York Appellate Division proffered a
similar, cursory assertion: although a manufacturer's compliance with
a regulation "'is some evidence of the exercise of due care,' it does
not preclude a conclusion that he was negligent."88 There were ex-
ceptions. For instance, a minuscule number of judges applied a com-
plete defense,89 but a greater number accorded conformity less,
although variable, weight as evidence. 90 Informative regarding the
first notion is an Oregon Supreme Court holding that "a drug, prop-
erly tested, labeled with appropriate warnings, approved by the
[FDA], and marketed properly under federal regulation, is, as a mat-
ter of law, a reasonably safe product."91 Equally instructive about the
second position is a Kansas Supreme Court articulation: "Compliance
is evidence of due care and that the conforming product is not defec-
tive, and may be conclusive in the absence of a showing of special
circumstances."92
The early history of products liability litigation indicates that sub-
stantial confusion attended the regulatory compliance defense's rec-
ognition and application. 93 Its origins are somewhat uncertain. Most
jurisdictions failed to adopt the concept in explicit terms, and a num-
ber of states that apparently relied upon the precept granted con-
84 Id.
85 Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973); Berkebile v.
Brantley Helicopter Corp., 281 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
86 Raymond, 484 F.2d at 1028; Berkebile, 281 A.2d at 710.
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
88 Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (N.Y. App. Div.
1967) (quoting Phillips v. Roux Labs., Inc., 145 N.Y.S.2d 449, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955)).
89 See, e.g., infra note 91 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., infra note 92 and accompanying text.
91 Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (Or. 1966). Lewis's holding remained good law
for fewer than ten years, however. It was overruled by McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528
P.2d 522, 534-35 (Or. 1974). In this ruling, the Oregon Supreme Court relied heavily on
the California Supreme Court's holding in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661
(Cal. 1973).
92 Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Kan. 1976). See generally OWEN,
supra note 5, § 14.3, at 886-91 (providing background information about the regulatory
compliance defense, including descriptions of legislative and judicial reform efforts).
93 See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
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formity different weight.94 More courts than legislatures articulated
the idea, which may have added to this general confusion. 95
2. Subsequent History
a. Doctrine
As recounted above, state legislatures and judges conventionally
assigned defendants' compliance with agency regulation no or mini-
mal significance. 96 Before 1980, legislative bodies ceded to judges the
articulation of substantive products liability law, including the value
given conformity with agency and FDA mandates. 97 Quite a few juris-
dictions have yet to confront the issue of agency or FDA compliance,
but virtually all courts that have addressed it have assigned conformity
no or de minimus relevance, and even legislatures that codified prod-
ucts doctrine frequently neglected to address this question. Many
courts simply determined that compliance was not relevant or specifi-
cally rejected defendants' requests to recognize the defense, and a few
eliminated or cabined the learned intermediary rule that judges often
applied by effectively merging it with the compliance defense in warn-
ing suits. 98 However, several courts accorded conformity somewhat
greater, albeit little, importance. 99 The jurisdictions that assigned
compliance weight limited its value by, for example, attributing con-
formity relevance as a minimum or a floor. An Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision afforded a thorough, nuanced rendition: "It is the
widely held view that the FDA sets minimum standards for drug manu-
facturers as to design and warnings .... [C]ompliance with these min-
imum standards does not necessarily complete the manufacturer's
duty."100 The Eighth Circuit similarly held that "FDA regulations are
generally minimal standards of conduct." 0 1 The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas also stated that "numerous courts
over the years have recognized that ... [FDA] regulations set out min-
imum requirements that drug manufacturers must follow which may
be supplemented by state tort laws which are stronger."10 2 The East-
ern District of Pennsylvania analogously held that "compliance with
an FDA regulation may establish that the manufacturer met the ap-
propriate minimum standards of due care, but compliance does not
94 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
96 See supra Part III.A.l.b.
97 See supra Part II.A.l.b.
98 See infra notes 100-26 and accompanying text.
99 See infra notes 100-26 and accompanying text.
100 Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 302 (Okla. 1997) (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added).
101 Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989).
102 Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876, 882 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
1017
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
necessarily absolve the manufacturer of all liability. Manufacturers
must meet state safety requirements."' 03
Indeed, the ALI's 1965 Restatement (Second) of Torts echoed this
judicial authority, stating that a government safety standard is a "mini-
mum and does not prevent a finding that a reasonable man would
have taken additional precautions where the situation is such as to call
for them."1 0 4 The 1998 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
similarly advised that a court appropriately considers compliance
when ascertaining defectiveness with regard to the dangers that the
mandate seeks to avoid but "does not preclude as a matter of law a
finding of product defect."10 5 Moreover, comment e provides that
safety regulations "generally are only minimum standards" and "estab-
lish a floor of safety below which sellers fall only at their peril."'10 6
Professor David Owen's authoritative contemporary hornbook Prod-
ucts Liability summarizes: "[I]t is fundamental law that governmental
safety standards adopt only a minimum safety floor below which an
actor may face criminal sanctions but above which due care may re-
quire the actor to be more cautious."' 0 7 In accord with these basic
tenets, "virtually all courts reject the general idea of a regulatory com-
pliance defense to products liability" based on the major theories of
negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort.10 8
Some judges have assigned conformity greater, although still rela-
tively little, weight as evidence, and even for these judges, the impor-
103 Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965); accord KEETON ET AL., supra
note 50, § 36, at 233 (A statutory "standard is no more than a minimum, and it does not
necessarily preclude a finding that the actor was negligent in failing to take additional
precautions."). Section 402A did not explicitly address regulatory compliance. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODS. LisA. § 4(b) (1998). This section reflects the
more defendant-friendly hue of the 1998 Restatement. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of
the Law of Products Liability: The AL! Restatement Project, 48 VAo. L. REv. 631, 660-64 (1995).
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODS. LAB. § 4 cmt. e. Compliance with such a regula-
tion may prove that a product is not defective as a matter of law if the regulation "was
promulgated recently ... the specific standard addresses the very issue . . .before the
court ... [and] the deliberative process by which the safety standard was established was
full, fair, thorough and reflected substantial expertise." Id.; see also Rabin, supra note 8, at
2051 (stating that in section 4, comment e, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
hints at "the strikingly more complex contemporary regulatory environment").
107 OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 888; accord DOBBS, supra note 4, § 373, at 1034.
108 OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 888. See, e.g., Ake v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp.
869, 873 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that although a party's "'compliance with a statute may
constitute some evidence of due care,'" a court is still free to find that a party's product is
defective (quoting Lugo by Lopez v. LJN Toys, Inc, 539 N.Y.S.2d 922, 924 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989))); Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 1997)
(holding that compliance with a federal statute is insufficient under Georgia state law to
establish that a party has exercised due care); Goodman v. Wenco Foods, Inc., 423 S.E.2d
444, 452 (N.C. 1992) (holding that a party's compliance with state and federal regulations
is "no bar to recovery on a breach of warranty theory").
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tance of compliance varies. The courts appear to invoke a case-
specific analysis that encompasses the evidence's importance as well as
the stringency and efficacy of regulation-which the fact-finder con-
siders in ascertaining whether a manufacturer was careful or sold a
product that lacks defects-yet any regulatory compliance is not dis-
positive.' 0 9 For example, the Ohio Supreme Court held that FDA
package-insert approval fails to "relieve the drug manufacturer from
providing a warning of 'all potential adverse reactions inherent in the
use of the drug of which the manufacturer, being held to the stan-
dards of an expert in the field, knew or should have known to exist at
the time of marketing.'"1 10 The Georgia Supreme Court analogously
instructed that conformity is only "a piece of the evidentiary puzzle"
rather than "an impenetrable shield from liability," which "render[s]
a manufacturer's choice of design immune from liability," but is a fac-
tor the jury reviews in addressing "whether the product design se-
lected was a reasonable one from among the feasible choices of which
the manufacturer was aware or should have been aware."'' Numer-
ous judges espouse similar formulations. Illustrative is the Eighth Cir-
cuit, which has mentioned that "FDA approval is not a shield to
liability,"' 12 while a plethora of federal district courts have admon-
ished that compliance fails to relieve drug sellers of liability. 113 Profes-
sor Owen asserts that these ideas have been the "rule since the early
days of modern products liability law" and are "as firmly entrenched
today as ever." 114
b. Justifications
There are myriad justifications for according conformity no or
little relevance. Many judges have not been very forthcoming with
these reasons, perhaps deeming the ideas so obvious that explication
is unnecessary. Mostjudges essentially announced, with minimal elab-
oration, that regulatory compliance is irrelevant, tendered only de
minimus support, or left their rationales implicit. For example, the
109 OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 888.
1 10 Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 258 (Ohio 1996) (quoting Seley v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 834 (Ohio 1981)); see also Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Phar-
macy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922, 928 (Utah 2003) (stating that FDA compliance and comment k do
"not extinguish strict liability claims based on manufacturing flaws or inadequate
warnings").
111 Doyle, 481 S.E.2d at 521 (citation omitted); accord Gable v. Vill. of Gates Mills, 784
N.E.2d 739, 748 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004).
112 Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); see also supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
''3 See, e.g., Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (W.D. Wis. 2006);
Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
114 OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 889. Other scholars concur that the rule is en-
sconced. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, § 224, at 573, § 373, at 1034; Noah, supra note 8, at
967.
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North Carolina Court of Appeals simply mentioned that "compliance
with governmental standards is not determinative of whether the
product is defective," 11 5 while the Ohio Court of Appeals merely re-
marked that "compliance in no manner insulates [a defendant] from
liability . .. [but is] a factor to be weighed by the jury."'1i 6 However,
others have been clearer or less terse, and their views receive analysis
below.
Some judges have implicitly expressed concerns that involve
agencies generally and the FDA in particular. 117 These emphasize
limitations on the regulatory process, such as agency capture, depen-
dence on manufacturers, imprecision, narrowness, politicization, risk
aversion, insufficient funding, stringency, and power. 118 The Ohio
Supreme Court grounded its explanation that "FDA approval of the
package insert" fails to absolve sellers mainly on the view that "the
FDA does no tests of its own, but bases its approval on data submitted
by the manufacturer."1 19 The Sixth Circuit also remarked that a plain-
tiff introduced an
articulable basis for disregarding an FDA finding-in this case the
finding that ritodrine was effective .... [T]he individual studies
relied on by the FDA were insufficient to support a finding of effi-
cacy as found by the FDA Advisory Committee, and the pooled data
requested by the Advisory Committee was statistically invalid. 120
Judges have also invoked modern products liability goals, al-
though some courts have cryptically treated the subject apparently be-
cause they found the justifications so clear that greater evaluation was
unwarranted. Numerous judges have alluded to, or implicitly or effec-
tively relied on, a compensation rationale-asserting that restoring in-
dividuals as much as possible to the condition they occupied before
allegedly defective items harmed them is a leading products objective,
so that the regulatory compliance defense frustrates its achievement
by essentially leaving a "compensation gap."121 A second, rather im-
115 Red Hill Hosiery Mill, Inc. v. MagneTek, Inc., 582 S.E.2d 632, 637 (N.C. Ct. App.
2003).
116 Gable, 784 N.E.2d at 748.
117 For commentator concerns, see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. Judges
may be understandably reluctant to criticize the FDA, as it rarely makes blatant errors.
118 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
119 Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 258 (Ohio 1996). The court recognized
that package insert contents "must reflect a balance between the need for conciseness and
a drug company's temptation to include every potential effect.., to avoid legal liability....
[T] his FDA policy does not relieve the drug manufacturer from providing a warning...."
Id. Some may even argue that drugs are almost always less safe than they are thought to be,
as testing rarely reveals all adverse effects.
120 Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 538 (6th Cir. 1993). See generally
OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 892-94 (discussing Tobin and the FDA approval's effect on
products liability suits).
121 See Rabin, supra note 8, at 2073. But see Schuck, supra note 27.
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portant objective that the defense can undercut is deterring manufac-
turers-both the one before the court and others that could behave
similarly-from engaging in the tortious actions that led to the suit.
Several judges have referred to the compensation and deterrence
rationales, particularly in asserting that sellers need to exercise rea-
sonable care and manufacture safe articles, regardless of regulatory
conformity. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to as-
sign regulatory compliance dispositive value, as that would undermine
Congress's "paramount purpose" of reducing injuries and saving lives
and allow "only minimum standards, as a matter of law, to represent
[Georgia's] standard of care." 122 "That outcome," said the court,
"would 'have the perverse effect of granting complete immunity from
design defect liability to an entire industry." ' 123 The Oklahoma Su-
preme Court analogously remarked that "[i] t has long been the con-
cern of this state to protect the health and safety of its citizens."' 24
Therefore, conformity with FDA "minimum standards does not neces-
sarily complete the manufacturer's duty."'125 This court and the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania also stated that requiring manufacturers
to comply with a state law duty to warn and FDA regulations could
increase pharmaceutical safety. 126 A closely related notion is manufac-
turer punishment for selling a defective article that harms a con-
sumer. No court has expressly invoked a punishment rationale, but
opinions that allude to compensation and deterrence appear to hint
at the concept. 127
Another justification some courts have enunciated is that the de-
fense-especially when applied with the learned intermediary rule in
pharmaceutical duty-to-warn cases-eviscerates the modern products
action as a "communicative or representational tort" based on the
manufacturer's representations. 128 In essence, courts are concerned
122 Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518, 520-21 (Ga. 1997).
123 Id. at 520-21 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996)).
124 Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 302 (Okla. 1997).
125 Id. at 302; see also State ex rel. Johnson &Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 913
(W. Va. 2007) (finding a drug manufacturer responsible for protecting "ultimate consum-
ers" in the context of rejecting the learned intermediary rule).
126 Edwards, 933 P.2d at 303; see Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 248 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (asserting that vaccine safety may be improved through civil judgments). Punish-
ment is meant to deter harmful conduct and correspondingly to encourage socially re-
sponsible activity, like designing goods or including warnings as to risks that exceed agency
standards, which involves the sale of consumer products. See id.
127 See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d
162, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing that tort law may fill gaps in the criminal law by pun-
ishing conduct that deserves condemnation despite not being expressly criminal).
128 See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Func-
tion and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. Rv. 1109, 1225 (1974) (describ-
ing the action as a communicative or representational tort and how courts analyze
pharmaceutical companies' representations in tort actions); see also supra note 4.
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about manufacturer compliance with a duty to provide accurate, clear
information and warnings of possible harm, namely through labels
and advertisements that manufacturers convey to physicians and pa-
tients. 129 A few judges have indicated that the defense alone, and par-
ticularly together with the learned intermediary rule, does not
account for the contemporary realities of marketing, the American
health care system, and FDA regulation. 130
In Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court thor-
oughly explicated these propositions. 13 1 The Justices severely re-
stricted the learned intermediary doctrine, which emphasizes warning
the prescribing physician, as based upon antiquated views of the
health care regime and pharmaceutical advertising.'3 2 The court
mandated manufacturers' warnings in the direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing context. 133 The court observed that managed care organizations
now provide medical services, patients buy drugs in grocery pharma-
cies and related outlets, and sellers advertise products to consumers
directly "on the radio, television, the Internet, billboards on public
transportation, and in magazines."' 34 The Justices found that numer-
ous problems attend this consumer advertising, which facilitates the
manipulation of information on safety and efficacy by presenting a
diluted representation of drug risks.' 35
The West Virginia Supreme Court endorsed these descriptive ac-
counts and criticisms, which it reiterated practically verbatim in de-
clining to adopt the learned intermediary "exception" to a general
warning responsibility. 136 The Justices agreed with Perez that direct-to-
consumer
advertising obviates each of the premises upon which the [learned
intermediary] doctrine rests: ". . . (1) reluctance to undermine the
doctor patient-relationship; (2) absence in the era of 'doctor knows
best' of need for the patient's informed consent; (3) inability of
129 See, e.g., BarbaraJ. Evans & David A. Flockhart, The Unfinished Business of U.S. Drug
Safety Regulation, 61 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 51-52 (2006).
130 See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 30-32 and accom-
panying text.
131 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); see also infra notes 144-45, 156-57 and accompanying
text.
132 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1246-47.
133 See id. at 1257.
134 Id. at 1246-47. See generally Rabin, supra note 8, at 2080-82 (describing the prem-
ises of tort liability based on overpromotion).
135 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1252-53 (citations omitted). See generally OWEN, supra note 5,
§ 9.6, at 613-14 (describing Perez's holding and expressing concern that other courts will
not adopt its reasoning).
136 State ex rel. Johnson &Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 910-11, 914 (W. Va.
2007).
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drug manufacturer to communicate with patients; and (4) complex-
ity of the subject."1 3 7
The court also based its judgment on the policy notions that drug
manufacturers "benefit financially from the sales of prescription drugs
and possess the knowledge regarding potential harms, [but it is] con-
sumers who bear the significant health risks of using those drugs"
even though they possess inferior knowledge respecting drug side ef-
fects. 13 8 Certain 1970s opinions, most notably Stevens v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 139 analogously remarked that juries could ascertain that a drug
company failed to warn adequately by so "watering down" warnings
and overpromoting a drug that it caused prescribing physicians to ig-
nore the warnings. 40
A few judges seemingly appreciated that, to the extent common
law products liability actions operate as an informal regulatory system,
the defense undercuts its efficacy. For instance, successful litigation
can encourage manufacturers to test drugs with greater rigor before
seeking approval, improve labeling, closely track subsequent usage,
and promote pharmaceuticals with doctors and consumers no more
aggressively than therapeutic benefits and risks warrant. These dy-
namics, thus, ostensibly fill a "regulatory gap" created when the
agency discharges its responsibilities insufficiently.' 4' The defense of
regulatory conformity undercuts this informal system.
137 Id. at 910 (quoting Perez, 731 A.2d at 1255); see also Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 116
F.3d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that for some courts, when all of the
learned intermediary rule's premises are absent, it "simply drops out of the calculus").
138 See Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 913; accord Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, 79 P.3d
922, 932 (Utah 2003); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
139 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
140 See id. at 660-61; Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971), abrogated on
other grounds by Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980); Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 183, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
141 The FDA may approve a new drug before it is certain about its safety and effective-
ness because it relies heavily on industry experimentation and is under intense pressure to
grant expeditious approval. However, Congress requires the FDA to consider broader soci-
etal norms and safety concerns; thus, expedited approvals can prompt trade-offs that may
not fully account for a patient's specific circumstances. For examples of this phenomenon,
see supra notes 31, 119-20 and accompanying text. Some judicial opinions are laconic,
even Delphic; yet others are not. Thus, the scholarly commentary's textual analysis is un-
necessary but may supplement judicial opinions when warranted. Scholars, including
Professors Dan Dobbs, Teresa Schwartz, and Marshall Shapo, as well as Owen and Rabin,
have recited a standard litany encompassing these ideas, as well as some additional ones.
For example, more scholars than judges suggest that the defense may thwart other prod-
ucts liability goals, such as safeguarding individual autonomy and bodily integrity, retribu-
tion, and affording plaintiffs their day in court. For a thorough catalog of these principles,
see David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: 7oward First Principles, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993).
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c. Application
The courts that accorded conformity no or limited relevance ap-
plied these propositions similarly. For example, courts that consid-
ered compliance irrelevant had the fact-finder ascertain whether the
consumer showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the manu-
facturer had acted negligently or was strictly liable because it purveyed
defective goods, regardless of conformity. 142
A few courts even specifically abrogated or dramatically restricted
the learned intermediary doctrine. That doctrine, when combined
with the regulatory compliance defense, effectively absolves sellers of
the responsibility to warn consumers. 143 For instance, the NewJersey
Supreme Court's Perez v. Wyeth Labs. decision held that the learned
intermediary doctrine should not protect pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers that seek to influence patient choices through mass advertising
from the obligation to warn consumers directly. 144 Thejustices stated
that a "patient must be informed of material risks"-those dangers to
which a reasonable patient would likely attach significance in choos-
ing a needed pharmaceutical.1 45 The West Virginia Supreme Court
analogously declined to recognize a learned intermediary "exception"
and imposed a duty to warn consumers on pharmaceutical manufac-
turers.146 The Restatement (Third) of Torts also contemplates that a
drug manufacturer will afford consumers adequate risk information
directly when it "knows or has reason to know that health-care provid-
ers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance
with the instructions or warnings. 147
Many judicial opinions according compliance with agency com-
mands greater value have not been especially informative, particularly
142 See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1973)
(rejecting the regulatory compliance defense in favor of an analysis of how the product
performs under ordinary circumstances, "a standard fully consistent with the Restatement
Rule which is geared to protect the consumer from conditions not contemplated or appar-
ent that are unreasonably dangerous for normal handling and consumption").
143 See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text (discussing judicial treatment of the
learned intermediary rule); infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (documenting legis-
lative implementation of the regulatory compliance defense).
144 See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1263 (N.J. 1999); see also supra notes
131-35, infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
145 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1257 (citation omitted); see also Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671
N.E.2d 252, 258 (Ohio 1996). See generally OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.6, at 613-14 (discussing
the Perez decision).
146 State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 914 (W. Va. 2007).
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d)(2) (1998). However, the ALI does
retain the learned intermediary rule. Id. at § 6(d)(1). Comment e supplies a caveat re-
garding an exception for drugs advertised directly to consumers. See OwEN, supra note 5,
§ 9.6, at 614 n.74; Rabin, supra note 8, at 2081; see also Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 911-13 (invoking
the Restatement to support rejection of the learned intermediary rule and the imposition
of a duty to warn).
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about the evidentiary weight to give compliance. Typical were Illinois
and New York courts, which merely announced that conformity to
agency requirements was "some evidence" that the manufacturer was
not negligent but observed that it was not controlling or determina-
tive, which thus permitted the fact-finder to assign it some value.1 4s
Judges who regarded compliance as a minimum or floor attrib-
uted little significance to conformity and had the fact-finder decide
whether the evidence of conformity adduced indicated that the manu-
facturer exercised reasonable care or sold a nondefective product.
For instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania instructed that agency regulations are a minimum
and their satisfaction does not absolve a manufacturer of liability.1 49
Those judges who granted compliance enhanced importance ostensi-
bly applied a case-specific analysis that enabled the fact-finder to ac-
cord the information differing weight vis-a-vis its relevance and
strength as well as the efficacy and stringency of relevant FDA
controls.
B. Increased Relevance of Regulatory Compliance
1. Doctrine
Although most legislatures and courts have ascribed conformity
minimal or no value, a small yet increasing number have afforded
compliance expanded relevance. Some jurisdictions have assigned it
considerable or greater weight, and a few actually treat the precept as
a complete defense. More legislatures than judges have adopted these
changes in essence as tort reform substantially at the instigation of
manufacturers, distributors, and insurers.1 50
Certain courts accord compliance great value. A Texas appellate
court ascertained that "[c]ompliance with government regulations is
strong evidence, although not conclusive, that a machine was not de-
fectively designed." 151 Many Fifth Circuit rulings applying Texas law
have observed that compliance is "strong and substantial evidence
that a product is not defective." 152
148 SeeJonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 306 N.E. 2d 312, 316 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967); accord
Gable v. Vill. of Gates Mills, 784 N.E. 2d 739, 748 (Ohio App. 2003), rev'd on other grounds,
816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004).
149 See Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Edwards v. Basel
Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 302 (Okla. 1997); see also supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., infra notes 158-61.
151 Sims v. Washex Mach. Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. App. 1995).
152 See, e.g., Lorenz v. Celotex Corp., 896 F.2d 148, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1990); accord Dar-
tez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 471 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1144 (5th Cir. 1985).
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A few courts have asserted that manufacturer conformity with
agency strictures establishes reasonable care or nondefectiveness "as a
matter of law.' 53 For instance, the Utah Supreme Court, relying on
comment k in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, held that pre-
scription pharmaceuticals "cannot, as a matter of law, be defective if
approved by" the FDA but admonished that approval "does not extin-
guish strict liability claims based on manufacturing flaws or inade-
quate warnings.' 1 54 Related was the California Supreme Court's
decision to adopt "for tort purposes the existing legislative and admin-
istrative standard of care," which "mandate[d] nonprescription drug
package warnings in English only."' 55
The New Jersey Supreme Court ascertained that manufacturer
compliance with FDA regulations on pharmaceutical warnings in the
direct-to-consumer advertising context generally supported a rebutta-
ble presumption of adequacy.1 56 The court explained: "For all practi-
cal purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-
acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA stan-
dards should be virtually dispositive of such claims. By definition, the
advertising will have been 'fairly balanced.'
157
The Arkansas and Washington legislatures instruct that regula-
tory compliance makes an article nondefective, 158 while a Michigan
statute treats FDA-approved pharmaceuticals as neither defective nor
unreasonably dangerous. 159 Laws in Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Mich-
igan, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah establish that compliance
yields a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer's goods lack
153 See Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 625 A.2d 1005, 1014 (Md. 1993); see a/soJones
v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Kan. 1976).
154 Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922, 928 (Utah 2003) (citing
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. k (1965)).
155 Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176, 177 (Cal. 1993); see also Rabin, supra
note 8, at 2083-84.
156 Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999).
157 Id. The Perez court also limited the scope of the learned intermediary rule and
criticized drug manufacturers' use of direct-to-consumer advertising. Id. at 1262-63; see
also supra notes 131-35, 144-45 and accompanying text (restricting the learned intermedi-
ary rule and criticizing direct-to-consumer advertising). But cf OWEN, supra note 5, § 9.6, at
613-14 (suggesting it is tautological that a plaintiff is unable to hold liable a manufacturer
that satisfies a regulation for exercising the care mandated if there were no reason to be
safer, as nonliability is predicated on the exercise of due care rather than regulatory
conformity).
158 See ARFx CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (2006); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050
(West 2007).
159 See MicH. COMP. L. ANN. § 600.2946(5) (1996); see also Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs.,
265 F. Supp. 2d 825, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658
N.W.2d 127, 130 (Mich. 2003).
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defects, 160 while a New Jersey statute instructs that FDA-approved la-
bels constitute adequate manufacturer warnings. 16'
2. Justifications
It is difficult to ascertain why legislatures in a number of states
have assigned conformity greater weight, as these bodies rarely proffer
explicit justifications for their actions. The courts of some jurisdic-
tions have been equally uninformative and appear simply to declare
the relevant doctrine. A few courts, however, were instructive.
Perhaps most essential, numerous courts touted the superior in-
stitutional competence that agencies, especially the FDA, possess vis-A-
vis lay juries. The California Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez v.
Plough, Inc.162 affords a very thorough explication of this rationale.
The court contended that "legislative and administrative bodies are
particularly well suited" for the task of deciding when second-lan-
guage warnings are appropriate, recounted "the FDA's experience
with foreign-language patient package inserts for prescription drugs,"
and chose not to adopt a case-by-case judicial articulation. 63 The
court found resolution of the underlying substantive question "pecu-
liarly susceptible to legislative and administrative investigation and de-
termination, based upon empirical data and consideration of the
viewpoints of all interested parties," as it required polycentric decision
making grounded in much empirical information that the agency was
best able to collect, analyze, and synthesize. 164 Thus, the court rea-
160 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)-(2) (2007); IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1(2); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3304(a) (2005); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 600.2946(4); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-
09 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2002); see
also O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1987); Ehlis v. Shire
Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198-99 (D.N.D. 2002) (examining the North Da-
kota statute); Duffee v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 879 F. Supp. 1078, 1084-85 (D. Kan. 1995);
Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (expanding on
the Indiana statute), overruled on other grounds by Schultz v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 977,
986 (Ind. 2006); Hughes v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., Inc., 2 S.W.3d 218 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) (expanding on the Tennessee statute).
161 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (2000); see also Perez v. Wyeth Labs Inc., 734 A.2d
1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999) (assessing the NewJersey statute). Most states accord little or no
relevance to regulatory compliance when determining damages. A few states assign vary-
ing relevance, especially to punitive damages. One allows punitive damages only when the
defendant knowingly withheld or misrepresented information that FDA regulations man-
dated be submitted and it was material and relevant to the injury sustained. See NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-5. A few others proscribe these damages for FDA-approved drugs. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(A)(1) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (2005); OR.
REv. STAT. § 30.927 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2.
162 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993).
163 Id. at 174-75.
164 Id. at 176.
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soned that deferring to, and capitalizing on, the agency's "superior
technical and procedural lawmaking resources" was justified. 165
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde's 1978 concurring
opinion in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.166 provides a second valuable
example. The justice astutely found that
once the common-law premise of liability is expressed as a balance
of social utility so closely the same as the judgment made in ad-
ministering safety legislation, it becomes very problematic to assume
that one or a sequence of law courts and juries are to repeat that
underlying social judgment de novo as each sees fit.1 6 7
Instead, when a product's design receives agency-supervised testing
and approval, no additional balance of whether it is unreasonably
dangerous
needs to be struck by a court or a jury unless . . . the standards of
safety and utility assigned to the regulatory scheme are less inclusive
or demanding than the premises of the law of products liability,
or ... the regulatory agency did not address the allegedly defective
element of the design or in some way fell short of its assigned
task. 1 6 8
Related justifications for according compliance more value impli-
cate agency controls. For example, deference to the FDA in Ramirez
was based on arguments that it would "preserve ... uniformity and
clarity [and] avoid adverse impacts upon the warning requirements
mandated by the federal regulatory scheme." 169 The Utah Supreme
Court adverted to the "elaborate regulatory system overseen by the
FDA" in fashioning a defense.17 0 The California Supreme Court in
Brown analogously observed
165 Id. at 177. However, the court carefully admonished that a duty-to-warn suit could
lie if "materially misleading" Spanish-language advertising led to the drug's purchase. Id.
See generally Rabin, supra note 8, at 2083-84 (describing the Ramirez ruling as narrowly
applicable only to dual language drug warning labels).
166 577 P.2d 1322, 1332 (Or. 1978) (citation omitted). Justice Linde was addressing
the FAA, but his views are equally applicable to the FDA.
167 Id. at 1334 (citations omitted).
168 Id. at 1335. He found the factors especially compelling when the agency "certifica-
tion of a design represents a more deliberate, technically intensive program to set and
control a given level of safety in priority to competing considerations than is true of many
run-of-the-mill safety regulations." Id. at 1333; see also Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d
950 (3d Cir. 1980) (expressing analogous sentiments when urging Congress to provide
guidance on motor vehicle safety regulation and observing that generalist judges and lay
juries are ill equipped to undertake the polycentric decision making required in resolving
vehicle design liability issues); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991)
(adverting to "elaborate regulatory system overseen by the FDA [and] the difficulties of
relying on individual lawsuits as a forum in which to review a prescription drug's design").
169 863 P.2d at 177.
170 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
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that the consumers of prescription drugs are afforded greater pro-
tection against defects than consumers of other products, since "the
drug industry is closely regulated by the [FDA], which actively con-
trols the testing and manufacture of drugs and the method by
which they are marketed, including the contents of warning
labels."17'
The New York Court of Appeals similarly mentioned that "the tort
system is not the only means of encouraging prescription drug safety;
the [FDA] has primary responsibility for that task."172
Many judges have voiced concerns about the need to facilitate
research and development on pharmaceuticals that save lives and
ameliorate health problems as well as the risks of overdeterring manu-
facturers. For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted that
"a rebuttable presumption that the duty to consumers is met by com-
pliance with FDA regulations helps to ensure that manufacturers are
not made guarantors against remotely possible, but not scientifically-
verifiable, side-effects of prescription drugs, a result that could have a
'significant anti-utilitarian effect."' 17 3 The court also cited academic
literature that noted "that over deterrence in drug advertising context
could impede and delay manufacturers from research and develop-
ment of new and effective drugs, force beneficial drugs from market,
lead to shortages in supplies and suppliers of pharmaceuticals, and
create unnecessary administrative costs."'1 74
The California Supreme Court espoused analogous ideas when it
observed that "[p]ublic policy favors the [expeditious] development
and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though some risks, per-
haps serious ones, might accompany their introduction, because
drugs can save lives and reduce pain and suffering."175 The court
stated that the fear of large judgments arising from heightened liabil-
ity could make producers "reluctant to undertake research programs
to develop some pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial or to
distribute others that are available to be marketed."1 76 The court con-
comitantly found that the greater expense of insuring for this liability
and of "research programs to reveal possible dangers not detectable
by available scientific methods could place the cost of medication be-
yond the reach of those who need it most."'1 77 The New York Court of
171 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1988) (citation omitted).
172 Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1991).
173 Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999) (citations omitted).
174 Id. (summarizing Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examin-
ing the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 466-67 (1997)).
175 Brown, 751 P.2d at 479. Brown addressed strict liability for prescription drugs, but
the ideas enunciated seem applicable to the regulatory compliance defense.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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Appeals similarly observed that "public policy favors the availability of
prescription drugs, even though most carry some risks," demonstrat-
ing awareness of overdeterrence risks-"the possibility that research
will be discouraged or beneficial drugs withheld from the market."178
3. Application
How those states that accord compliance more relevance apply
the concept depends substantially on the applicable rules that legisla-
tures or courts enunciate. For instance, jurisdictions that treat con-
formity as strong evidence that a manufacturer acted reasonably or
sold a consumer product without defects in effect apply a rebuttable
presumption that the harmed litigant can overcome by introducing
more persuasive evidence. Illustrative is a federal district court that
ascertained that evidence of a pharmaceutical's "off-label" use rebut-
ted a statutory presumption that FDA compliance meant that the drug
lacked defects. 179 Another court found that a plaintiff might show
that the regulation was outdated or that the manufacturer would be
aware of product dangers not contemplated by the agency regula-
tion.180 A third court declared that a plaintiff may rebut the presump-
tion even without expert testimony.181 The New Jersey Supreme
Court observed that "in the area of direct-to-consumer advertising of
pharmaceuticals [a] rebuttable presumption should apply when a
manufacturer complies with FDA advertising, labeling and warning re-
quirements." 18 2 However, the court contended that the "presumption
is not absolute" 183 and indicated that it might be overcome in "unique
circumstances" when the FDA imposed no warning strictures and "de-
spite evidence of adequacy of product labeling." 18 4
Jurisdictions that find regulatory compliance demonstrates rea-
sonable care, the absence of defects, or proves as a matter of law that
an item is not unreasonably dangerous, or that use the learned inter-
mediary notion, especially together with the compliance defense, es-
sentially recognize and apply a complete defense. 185  Thus, a
178 Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. 1991); accord Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1991). Enright addressed liability to a child whose
grandmother ingested DES during pregnancy, but the ideas espoused are applicable to the
regulatory compliance defense.
179 Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.N.D. 2002).
180 Duffee v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 879 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Kan. 1995).
181 Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 706-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Because the plaintiff
has the burden of proof anyway, Professor Owen found it difficult to understand what
additional proof must be offered to rebut the presumption. See Owen, supra note 5, § 14.3
n.38, at 894.
182 Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999).
183 Id. (citations omitted).
184 Id. (describing Feldman v. Lederle Labs., Inc., 592 A.2d 1176, 1197-98 (N.J.
1991)).
185 Cf supra notes 153-55, 158-59 and accompanying text.
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manufacturer is absolved of liability unless it perpetrates fraud on the
FDA. 186
In sum, a relatively small, but increasing, number of state legisla-
tures and courts have assigned defendant conformity with agency reg-
ulation more value, and some jurisdictions have even specifically
created an express defense. These considerations have restricted
manufacturer exposure to liability for selling allegedly defective prod-
ucts. Thus, the next section reviews the downsides and the benefits of
ascribing regulatory compliance greater weight.
IV
COST-BENEFIT ANALYsis OF AN FDA REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
A. Introduction
A comparatively small, yet mounting, number of legislative and
judicial bodies have accorded regulatory conformity enhanced signifi-
cance, and this phenomenon has yielded detriments and advantages.
The previous section of this Article, which recounted or alluded to
most of these disadvantages and benefits, intimated that the negative
effects usually outweigh the positive impacts. However, the salience of
this judgment warrants the more explicit analysis below, which reaf-
firms the somewhat tentative conclusion above. Because Part III of
this Article comprehensively examined how states enunciate, justify,
and apply a regulatory compliance defense, the impact of the notion
on products liability actions merits abbreviated treatment here.
B. Disadvantages
The principal detriment of recognizing and applying a regulatory
compliance defense is that it undermines consumer efforts to impose
liability on manufacturers for the harm allegedly defective goods
cause. This adverse feature in turn erodes the vindication of several
products liability goals, which this Article investigated earlier18 7 and
revisits below.
Compensating victims hurt by defective items is the major objec-
tive that products liability jurisprudence now serves. 18 8 Consequently,
a regulatory compliance defense subverts the realization of this goal-
making individuals whole by returning them to the state enjoyed
186 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)(2)
(2005); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming June 2008).
187 See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
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before defective articles caused injury-because it effectively allows a
''compensation gap."
The defense can undercut additional purposes. A relatively im-
portant one is specific deterrence, through court action, of the manu-
facturer from repeating its behavior and general deterrence of
additional parties that may conduct themselves similarly. 189 Related is
punishment for selling defective goods that hurt an individual. An-
other notion, which a few courts articulate, is that the regulatory com-
pliance defense-which judges frequently apply with the learned
intermediary rule in the duty-to-warn context-erodes the modern
products action as a "communicative or representational tort.'19 0
Insofar as products lawsuits essentially function as an informal
regulatory system, the defense also undermines its effectiveness. For
instance, plaintiffs' successful pursuit of these cases may encourage
sellers to institute numerous actions that will benefit consumers. 19'
Those incentives can fill a "regulatory gap" that arises when the FDA is
overly lenient, sluggish, imprecise, narrow, dated, politicized, respon-
sive to the drug industry, or risk-averse or makes an error.' 92 A con-
crete illustration is the possibility that the FDA will approve a new
drug before the manufacturer has comprehensively tested the phar-
maceutical and before the agency is justifiably convinced about safety
and effectiveness, partly because it relies so heavily on industry experi-
mentation and is under intense pressure to grant expeditious ap-
proval.193 The FDA concomitantly analyzes and balances wider
societal notions involving safety and efficacy, which implicate trade-
offs that fail to account thoroughly for a specific patient, in marked
contrast to liability actions, which effectively facilitate individualized
consideration of someone whom an ostensibly bad pharmaceutical
hurts. '94
Statutory adoption of the defense might also erode the long-
standing tradition whereby courts articulate products liability rules, in
the process sacrificing common law virtues-namely the inherent flex-
ibility that the common law affords to craft these doctrines, which may
reflect evolving societal norms. Federalizing the defense, as legisla-
189 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
191 See Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (arguing that civil
judgments provide incentives to improve drug safety).
192 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
193 See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 31, at 22-24; supra notes 119-20
and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. These suits enable numerous particular
consumers harmed by allegedly defective pharmaceuticals-who, unlike regulated inter-
ests, lack the subject matter expertise, organizational capabilities, and resources necessary
to affect legislative and FDA determinations-partially to offset the advantages that regu-
lated industries possess.
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tors, manufacturers, insurers, and commentators have proposed,
would similarly undercut another venerable convention-state as-
sumption of lead responsibility to declare substantive products liability
rules unless compelling justifications necessitate federalization. 195
Lawmakers across the political spectrum have apparently codified doc-
trine sparingly because they respect federalism and state autonomy,
allowing state jurisdictions to operate as laboratories. 196
C. Benefits
Judicial or legislative recognition and application of a regulatory
compliance defense should yield a number of benefits. Perhaps most
importantly, this recognition would capitalize on substantial FDA ex-
pertise accumulated over the last century as the agency to which Con-
gress assigns responsibility for protection of consumers through
approving the safety, effectiveness, and labeling of new drugs, and
monitoring them thereafter.19 7  Numerous observers believe FDA
technical mandates, methods for investigating and reviewing new
drugs, continued monitoring of previously approved drugs, and scien-
tific quality to be exceptional.19 8
These attributes mean that the FDA possesses superior institu-
tional competence, especially vis-a-vis an individual lay jury of a partic-
ular jurisdiction, when resolving a specific fact-bound inquiry. The
agency enjoys great comparative advantage in collecting, analyzing,
and synthesizing complicated empirical data that implicate science,
technology, medicine, and public policy, as well as in evaluating and
balancing risks, advantages, and cost when considering new drug ap-
plications and overseeing pharmaceuticals.19 9 The FDA is also politi-
cally accountable because it has to rationalize its decision making and
receives careful scrutiny from lawmakers, judges, the media, and ex-
perts in scientific, technological, medical, and policy areas. 200 The
FDA, therefore, sharply contrasts with juries throughout the nation,
195 See generally AnthonyJ. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE
L.J. 947 (2001) (assessing the concerns that arise when federal lawmakers require state
courts to adopt federal procedural rules).
196 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 103-04 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); OWEN, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 4, § 1.2, at 24. As to the experimentation rationale for
federalism, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (1995);
and New StateIce Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (BrandeisJ., dissenting) (1932). How-
ever, the nationalized and globalized character of the market for drugs indicates that an
argument favoring country-wide uniformity would be somewhat persuasive. See Schuck,
supra note 27.
197 See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability and
Regulation, 58 OI..A. L. REV. 135, 163 (2005) (referring to the FDA's regulations as "exact-
ing"); supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
199 See, e.g., supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 8, at 2076; Schuck, supra note 27.
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which have a de minimus appreciation of, and no responsibility for,
the larger context of the agency's ongoing, complex policy
development.
Insofar as states prescribe a regulatory compliance defense, and
especially if Congress legislated one, manufacturers would be able to
satisfy a national, uniform command rather than diverse requirements
articulated by juries in multiple states-which can overdeter and be
expensive and unpredictable, frustrating technological, design, re-
search, planning, and marketing activities. 2° t The greater consistency
and definiteness afforded by a national standard would encourage the
huge manufacturer investments that are necessary to research, de-
velop, label, gain approval for, and market reasonably priced new
pharmaceuticals that save lives and temper health difficulties. 20 2
D. Resolution
In sum, the above evaluation indicates that the quantitative and
qualitative detriments of an FDA regulatory compliance defense
eclipse the advantages that it furnishes. However, this conclusion is
not definitive and may even appear controversial-the issue might ac-
tually present a somewhat close question. Accordingly, numerous rec-
ommendations deserve exploration.
V
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. An Introductory Word
Part IV ascertains that the downsides of a regulatory compliance
defense outweigh the benefits. Thus, jurisdictions that have not insti-
tuted this defense should maintain the status quo and those recogniz-
ing the doctrine ought to abolish the defense or severely restrict its
enforcement. Legislators and jurists that deem the concept's advan-
tages greater than this Article suggests should at least rarely establish
the defense as a complete one because this action precludes harmed
201 See supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 26, 162-78 and accompanying text. A regulatory compliance de-
fense would also significantly reduce or temper a "products liability tax," which manufac-
turers assert the common law products framework exacts inherently by unnecessarily
exposing them to liability and substantial awards, the costs of defending against cases, and
reputational and sales losses, even bankrupting some companies. Cf Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 57 (1982) ("Uncer-
tainty as to the amount of punitive damages that may be assessed also has incentive effects
on the behavior of potential defendants. Some will overestimate not only the likelihood
but also the amount of potential punitive damage assessments, and incur excessive avoid-
ance costs; others will underestimate potential liability and underinvest in the avoidance of
conduct that merits punitive damage liability."); Viscusi, supra note 26, at 1455 ("[T]here
can be great difficulty in determining the appropriate additional [punitive damage] award
necessary to create appropriate deterrence, but not over-deterrence.").
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individuals' recovery and is too draconian. These jurisdictions might
treat conformity as a minimum or floor. The remaining states ought
to treat compliance as evidence in determining negligence or defect
by applying a finely calibrated analysis that balances an FDA man-
date's comparative stringency with the relative patient need for, and
efficacy of, the pharmaceutical. To the extent that jurisdictions retain
the defense, they should consider qualifying or limiting it. Illustrative
conditions are: the FDA should approve the pharmaceutical risk in
the new drug and label-approval regime and create an optimal safety
level, while defendants must tender to the FDA and consumers all in-
formation on the drug's safety and efficacy required by the agency
and Congress. Notwithstanding how states address regulatory con-
formity, federal lawmakers must expeditiously implement bipartisan
legislation that would respond to valid concerns about the FDA by
enhancing its power, resources, information, transparency, and insula-
tion from manufacturers' pressures. 20 3
B. Preferable Approaches
States that have yet to recognize and apply a regulatory compli-
ance defense should retain this position mainly because the disadvan-
tages imposed by the defense outstrip its benefits. Jurisdictions that
now recognize and apply the defense should reconsider the idea's use
and eliminate the doctrine, or sharply limit the relevance that they
accord regulatory compliance.
States that find the concept's advantages greater should infre-
quently make the defense complete, as that is too extreme and gener-
ally prevents recovery by injured consumers. A valuable example of
this phenomenon is the effect of the learned intermediary approach
in combination with the defense, which essentially insulates from lia-
bility to consumers those manufacturers whose FDA-approved labels
appropriately warn prescribing physicians. This rule should be abro-
gated or severely curtailed because it does not account for several
modem realities. 20 4 The FDA should also tailor label approval to
modem marketing developments-mass advertising, especially on tel-
evision and the internet-and differences in advertising's target audi-
ence-consumers, not physicians-with reforms, such as more
efficacious patient package inserts and less technical directions for
use.
205
Jurisdictions that maintain this rule should assign it substantially
decreased relevance or at least not treat it as a complete defense that
203 See, e.g., Editorial, The F.D.A. in Crisis: It Needs More Money and Talent, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2008, at WK14; supra note 33 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 4, 30-31, 130-40 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
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essentially alleviates manufacturers of responsibility. For instance, ju-
risdictions might consider compliance to be some evidence that the
warning is adequate, depending on its relative comprehensiveness, ac-
curacy, and clarity. They might also consider the stringency of agency
controls, including how assiduously the company and the FDA track a
label's use following approval and whether adverse consumer events
prompt corrective label adjustments.
Those jurisdictions that conclude the regulatory compliance de-
fense's benefits are greater than this Article asserts should investigate
granting conformity some value by effectively treating it as a minimum
or floor. Judges, accordingly, would not make compliance determina-
tive of products liability. Rather, the fact-finder would ascertain
whether the manufacturer committed negligence or sold a defective
product by assigning weight to conformity in light of its strength vis-a-
vis the regulation's relevance and persuasiveness, and balancing that
against the FDA control's efficacy and strictness.
Jurisdictions that hold regulatory compliance must not be a mini-
mum or floor for liability purposes should treat it as evidence bearing
on negligence or defect. Judges would apply a meticulously calibrated
assessment that invokes relative FDA stringency, a patient's compara-
tive need for the drug, and the relative effectiveness of the pharma-
ceutical and its label. More specifically, when (a) the agency
considered rigorous pre- and postapproval testing, carefully scruti-
nized the manufacturer's application, and weighed safety risks, bene-
fits, and costs before tendering approval; (b) the plaintiff had a
compelling need for the medication to preserve life; and (c) there
were few or no effective, safer alternatives, the evidence of manufac-
turer negligence or defect would be rather weak. In contrast, when
the agency was less demanding; the consumer wanted the medication
for nonlife threatening conditions; and there were many, relatively ef-
fective, safe options, the evidence of negligence or defect would be
stronger.
In short, I believe these approaches are preferable to a regulatory
compliance defense, as they offer more advantages and better honor
the important aims of contemporary products liability jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, some legislatures and courts may find that this conclu-
sion and its rationales are not persuasive, while the question is un-
clear. For example, in some circumstances it may be inappropriate
either to apply a complete defense or to abrogate the rule. Thus, a
qualified, or limited, regulatory compliance defense appears to war-
rant review.
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C. Qualified Regulatory Compliance Defense
This defense is narrower than the idea canvassed throughout the
Article because several preconditions would govern the concept's op-
eration. 20 6 One is that the FDA must have approved the exact risk or
label terminology that the plaintiff contends makes the pharmaceuti-
cal defective or the warning inadequate. A second qualification is that
the agency regulation must create an optimal safety level, not a floor
above which a finding of defect remains proper. A third condition is
that the manufacturer needs to divulge all safety and effectiveness in-
formation required by the FDA and Congress in a timely fashion. A
defendant specifically must comprehensively apprise the FDA of facts
and statistical analyses pertinent to the continuing rationale for drug
approval and company advertising, while related communications
must not mislead doctors or patients about safety or efficacy. One
writer who champions the qualified defense acknowledges that "find-
ing the regulatory sweet spot"-weighing the objectives of pharmaceu-
tical safety and availability, reasonable expense, timely FDA decision
making, as well as patient information and choice-is a daunting as-
signment, even as the proponent urges that the limited regulatory de-
fense would help meet the challenge. 20 7
D. FDA Reform
Notwithstanding how state legislatures and judiciaries resolve the
controversial debate about the regulatory compliance defense, federal
lawmakers must expeditiously implement promising FDA reforms that
appear in a bipartisan measure that Congress enacted in 2007.208 Rig-
orous implementation, especially in conjunction with the preferable
approaches that this Article presents, could well rectify or ameliorate
the major disadvantages that the regulatory compliance defense
imposes.
In a world of perfect agency regulation, the defense and common
law suits would obviously be unnecessary, as the FDA would approve
no pharmaceuticals that harm consumers. However, this rather uto-
pian view fails to depict accurately the existing state of regulation or
the world that consumers now inhabit.20 9 Moreover, particular
agency flaws are effectively intrinsic or essentially so intractable that
they defy constructive reform. Nonetheless, the statute that Congress
recently enacted should improve the FDA by expanding its power,
206 I rely in this subsection on Noah, supra note 8, at 939-60 (describing different
versions of the regulatory compliance defense); see also Schuck, supra note 27.
207 See Schuck, supra note 27.
208 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
209 See OWEN, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 892-94; Rabin, supra note 8, at 2076. But see
Schuck, supra note 27.
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funding, information, and transparency, while the legislation might
also limit the agency's politicization and dependence on those it regu-
lates.210 These notions, particularly in synergy with certain alterna-
tives cataloged above, could enhance the prospect of discovering that
regulatory ambit, which, together with products litigation, best de-
creases consumer injuries that result from defective pharmaceuticals.
CONCLUSION
A small, but growing, number of jurisdictions have recognized
and applied an FDA regulatory compliance defense. However, this
rule's detriments eclipse its advantages. If legislatures and courts fol-
low the guidance proffered, they should be able to improve pharma-
ceutical consumers' safety through rigorous FDA oversight and a
vibrant product liability cause of action.
210 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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